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We examine the relationship between population characteristics and price dispersion for 
75 prescription drugs in five markets.  Based on models of price dispersion, we consider that 
search costs are likely lower for the elderly, who are repeat purchasers.  Expected benefits from 
search  are  likely  higher  for  low  income  households,  who  lack  insurance.    Our  results  are 
consistent with the hypothesis that for communities with a large percentage of elderly and poor 
population, search effort is greater for pharmaceutical drugs, causing lower price dispersion.  By 
understanding the characteristics of who searches for low drug prices, we begin to identify the 
motives of consumers that might also lead to search for the lowest cost healthcare provider or 
lowest cost insurance. The results suggest that the 2004 Medicare legislation that closed the 
pharmaceutical donut hole may have reduced search by the elderly, increased price dispersion, 
and potentially increased the average price of prescription drugs. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Prescription drugs are almost ideal examples of homogeneous commodities.  A patient 
can fill her prescription at any pharmacy she chooses and expect to obtain exactly the same 
medicine.   A priori, therefore, it would seem that if any commodity obeyed the law of one price 
then a prescription drug would be that commodity.  That is not the case.  Using data from two 
townships in up-state New York, Sorenson (2001) provided compelling evidence that the prices 
of individual drugs varied substantially among pharmacies within each of the two communities.  
The extent of price dispersion differed among individual drugs in ways that were consistent with 
the predictions of models that explain price dispersion on the basis of costly consumer search.   
  Price dispersion among homogeneous goods is not unique.  Other studies have examined 
the determinants of price dispersion in the markets for gasoline (Adams 1997), water (Yoskowitz 
2002), automobiles (Dahlby and West 1986; and Goldberg and Verboven 2001), and grocery 
products (Aalto-Setala 2003).  They have also generally concluded that prices in those markets 
vary in ways that cannot be accounted for solely by heterogeneity in product attributes with 
respect  to  physical  characteristics,  space,  time,  or,  in  cross  country  studies,  government 
regulation.    In  addition,  apparent  violations  of  the  law  of  one  price  have  been  observed  in 
commodity markets for agricultural products and raw materials that are relatively homogeneous 
with  respect  to  their  physical  characteristics  (see,  for  example,  Goodwin  et  al).    However, 
Sorenson‟s study of pharmaceutical drugs is of particular interest because he examines prices in 
two clearly defined markets for commodities that are physically identical.  He finds that search 
costs,  measured  by  the  frequency  of  drug  purchases,  affect  the  amount  of  price  dispersion.  
Models of price dispersion based on costly search for information by consumers seem to provide  
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plausible alternative explanations, especially as many prescription drugs are not widely used and 
their prices are not commonly known by buyers. 
  As Sorenson observes, his empirical analysis of the effects of search costs is incomplete 
in at least one important respect.  Sorenson‟s data were for only two geographically adjacent 
markets (less than 30 miles apart).  Thus, he could not investigate the effects of characteristics of 
the communities being served by the pharmacies in those markets.   
In  this  paper,  we  address  the  question,  “who  searches  for  the  lowest  drug  prices?”  
Research by Talukdar (2008) and Morton et al (2003) show a link between consumer search 
characteristics and retail and internet pricing. Thus, search characteristics for consumer groups 
may be very different across drug markets as well.  For example, the proportions of the elderly 
and the poor in a population served by a market may affect the amount of search in that market 
because of differences in opportunity costs of time and expected benefits from search.   We 
expand upon previous research to examine market characteristics that affect price dispersion 
among prescription drugs. Our analysis of consumer search characteristics is particularly relevant 
to the current policy debate concerning healthcare reform, changes to Medicare, and insurance 
coverage through the workplace.   
  We examine price dispersion for pharmaceutical drugs in five geographically isolated 
markets in Montana using data obtained from a cross section survey, administered by the authors 
on the pricing of 75 different drugs by individual pharmacies.  The five markets are a minimum 
of eighty miles  apart  from  one another  and have distinctly different  demographic  and other 
socio-economic characteristics.  The new data set permits a more extensive evaluation of the 
effects of search and population characteristics on price dispersion.    
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The major contribution of this paper is to identify the characteristics in a community that 
affect the costs of search and search effort for the lowest priced drugs, by examining the impact 
on price dispersion.  The proportion of the population who are elderly and the proportion of the 
population in poverty are two market indicators of search costs used in the model.  The results 
for both of these variables are consistent with the hypothesis that price dispersion is lower in 
markets where costs of search are low and expected benefits high. As several models of price 
dispersion  predict,  this  study  provides  evidence  that  in  markets  where  consumers  have  low 
search costs and high expected benefits, pharmaceutical prices vary less than in markets with 
high search costs and low expected benefits.  These findings suggest that the 2004 Medicare 
legislation, which closed the prescription drug donut hole for many elderly people, may have 
increased  price  dispersion  and  the  average  price  of  prescription  drugs,  with  adverse 
consequences for the cost of that program. 
This study also addresses a related but different issue.  Several news articles from 2004 
reported that imports of Canadian drugs were a major concern for pharmacy manufacturers, 
consumers, and policy makers (New York Times, 2004).   In 2005, the Canadian health minister, 
Uijal  Dosanjh,  avowed  that  Canada  intended  to  ban  the  bulk  export  of  prescription  drugs 
(Associated Press,  2005).  Three of the  cities included in  the analysis are relatively close to 
Canadian cities (within about a two hour drive).  Consumers in those communities, therefore, 
could possibly have acquired prescription drugs directly from Canadian pharmacies where prices 
for many of those drugs were apparently much lower and also available to U.S. citizens at the 
time of the survey (the summer of 2004). Thus, we also examine whether proximity to Canada 
affects  the  level  and  dispersion  of  drug  prices  within  the  five  markets  for  which  data  are 
available.    
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II.  THEORETICAL ISSUES OF PRICE DISPERSION 
The  theoretical  literature  indicates  that  price  dispersion  in  a  market  is  likely  to  be 
influenced by several factors: (a) seller heterogeneity, (b) product characteristics that affect the 
benefits  from  search,  and  (c)  consumer  characteristics  that  affect  the  cost  of  search  by 
consumers.  Price dispersion may  be observed  in  a market  because of heterogeneity  among 
sellers with respect to production costs (Reinganum, 1979) or product attributes (Besancenot and 
Vranceanu, 2004).  In addition, however, as Stigler (1961) showed, price dispersion may occur 
in a market because some or all consumers lack information about product prices and must incur 
search costs in order to obtain that information.   
Several models have extended Stigler‟s insights on consumer search.  Salop and Stiglitz 
(1977), for example, show that a two-price equilibrium can occur where increasing returns to 
scale exist at the firm level and consumers have identical search costs.  Burdett and Judd (1983) 
present  a model in  which price dispersion  occurs  because consumers are heterogeneous  and 
collect different amounts of price information.  McMillan and Morgan (1988), in a dynamic 
context, find that price dispersion can arise when search costs differ among consumers and, in 
consequence, some consumers search more intensively and become better informed than others.   
Wilde and Schwartz (1979) obtain price dispersion from a model in which consumers differ with 
respect to tastes and propensities for search.   
The amount of consumer search is a function of both expected search costs and benefits.  
The  opportunity  costs  of  search  time  are  likely  to  be  lower  for  members  of  low  income 
households, and the elderly, defined as individuals over 65, who are likely to be retired.  Thus, in 
communities with larger proportions of the elderly and households in poverty, search effort is 
likely to be greater in the market for pharmaceutical drugs.    
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On average, individuals over 65 take more medications than other consumers and often 
pay with cash (HHS Weekly Report).  Thus, the benefits from any given level of search are also 
likely to be greater for that group because search is being carried out over multiple commodities 
and economies of scope may be achieved.   Repeated visits to the pharmacy for the elderly imply 
a lower cost to search for information.  Finally, during the time period we consider in 2004, the 
elderly were not covered for prescription drugs by Medicare (Part D) which started in January 1, 
2006.  The high expected benefit and low cost of search suggests that the elderly search for lower 
drug prices. 
For individuals below the poverty line, the market price for drugs impacts their purchase 
decisions, because they are less likely to have insurance and/or pay a flat fee for prescriptions. 
Even Medicaid, which helps some low-income individuals with health insurance, does not cover 
all  low  income  consumers,  because  eligibility  depends  on  several  criteria  including  age, 
pregnancy, disability, blindness, income and resources, and citizenship.  Thus, for people below 
the poverty line, the expected benefit from searching is expected to be greater than for people 
above the poverty line.  Having more low income consumers in a community may lead to more 
search, as these individuals face a tighter budget and therefore, are more likely to search for 
savings.   
DATA 
Measuring price dispersion requires price data from different sellers of the commodity in 
each market.  Sorenson examined price dispersion in two towns in up-state New York where, at 
the time of his study, each pharmacy was required to post prices publicly in the store for the top 
150 drugs in terms of state-wide prescriptions.  Thus, he was able to obtain data on prices for at 
least 150 separate pharmaceutical products from each outlet.  In contrast to pharmacies in New  
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York  markets,  pharmacies  in  Montana  are  not  required  to  post  prices  for  drugs  in  a  public 
location within each place of business. In our study of Montana, data had to be obtained through 
a survey instrument that was filled out by each participating outlet.
i  The survey instrument was 
administered to 58 pharmacies in five geographically distinct markets over the period July 1, 
2004 to August 15, 2004.  A total of 33 completed surveys were completed and returned, 
yielding a response rate of 57 percent.   The five cit ies - Billings, Bozeman/Belgrade, Great 
Falls, Kalispell, and Missoula  - are a minimum of eighty miles apart from each other and no 
other town with a pharmacy is closer than 20 miles away from these markets.
ii  In each of these 
markets, price data were obtained from a minimum of five pharmacies for each of the 75 drugs 
included in the survey.
iii  
Price dispersion is likely to be affected by specific market characteristics that serve as 
indicators of the amount of consumer search in each market.  Thus, demographic variables on the 
population proportions of the elderly (aged 65 and over) and the poor (individuals below the 
federal poverty line) were collected for each of the five markets from the 2001 U.S. Census.  
Data on the distance of each market from the closest competing market in Canada were collected 
from an internet mapping service. 
  The degree of price dispersion for each drug is likely to be affected by the characteristics 
of that drug that affect consumer benefits from search, as well as the availabili ty of substitutes. 
These  characteristics  include  a  drug‟s  frequency  of  use.      For  each  drug,  therefore,  typical 
dosages and therapy durations were collected from Mosby‟s 2004 Drug Guide.   In addition, 
Thomson  Healthcare‟s  2003 Drug Topics  Redbook was  used to  collect information  on each 
drug‟s average wholesale price and the number of manufacturers and re-packagers of the drug.  
The United States National Library of Medicine and the National Institute of Health served as  
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sources for information on brand name drugs that have generic substitutes, the number of those 
substitutes, brand name drugs that do not have substitutes, and the class of treatment for which 
each drug was used.   
  Differences among pharmacies with respect to services may also affect price dispersion.   
Respondents  to  the survey  were  asked to  provide information  on their operations,  including 
whether they offered a delivery service and whether it was free, their proximity to hospitals, 
physicians,  medical  centers,  and  retirement  communities,  availability  of  discounts  for  senior 
citizens, whether the pharmacy was located in a grocery store or a department store, whether it 
was a member of a chain or United Buying Group, and its hours of operation.  In addition, the 
authors obtained data on thirty eight commonly marketed non-prescription items sold by each 
pharmacy.
iv 
III.  EMPIRICAL MEASURES OF PRICE DISPERSION  
Price dispersion  for  a  commodity within a  given market  can be measured in  several 
different ways.  Two direct measures are the range and standard deviation of the price of a drug 
obtained using the actual price data.  These measures are regressed on a set of explanatory 
variables  that  account  for  heterogeneity  among  sellers  (pharmacies)  and  drug  and  market 
characteristics that affect incentives for search.  Alternatively, empirical models can be estimated 
that regress individual drug prices on pharmacy-specific characteristics (such as hours and days 
of service, wholesale supplier, etc.) and other variables unrelated to search costs.  The residuals 
from those models, “purged” of such effects, are then used to construct price dispersion measures 
which are regressed on variables related to search costs.   Both of these approaches are used here. 
Price  dispersion  measures  computed  directly  from  price  data  indicate  that  prices  for 
pharmaceutical  drugs  vary  substantially  both  within  and  between  individual  markets.      The  
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degree of this variation is illustrated in table I in which average prices, price ranges, standard 
deviations and coefficients of variation are reported for six drugs in each of the five markets 
included in the study.  Prescriptions for four of the six drugs were relatively inexpensive, with 
average prices in the five markets ranging from $7.91 to $13.58, while prescriptions for the other 
two were relatively expensive, with average prices in the five markets ranging from $87.41 to 
$122.20.    
(insert table I here) 
Within each market, prices for some of these drugs exhibited considerable variation.  For 
example, among the low priced drugs in table I, the average price for alprazolam (0.5MG) in the 
Billings market was $12.80, but the range in prices was $21.34 and the coefficient of variation 
was 64%.  However, in the same market, other drugs with similar average prices exhibit much 
less price variation.  In the Billings market, the average price for acetamine codeine #3 was 
$9.80, the range in prices was only $1.74, and the coefficient of variation was 6%.   In addition, 
the same drug may exhibit much more price variability in one market than  in another.  For 
example, the coefficient of variation for the price of acetamine codeine ranged from 6% in the 
Billings market to 26% in the Great Falls market.   
Further, while the coefficients of variation presented in Table I suggest that high price 
drugs exhibit less variation than low priced drugs, price ranges for more expensive drugs can be 
substantial  even  when  their  coefficient  of  variations  are  relatively  small.    Coefficients  of 
variation for the two high priced drugs range from 5% for Allegra-D in Billings to 15% for 
Augmentin (875 mg) in Great Falls.  Coefficients of variations for the four lower priced drugs 
range from 6% for acetamine codeine #3 in Billings to 64% for alprazolam, also in the Billings 
market, in all but 3 of 16 cases exceed 20%, and in all but one case exceed 15%.  
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Measures of price dispersion obtained directly from the sample data reflect the effects of 
all sources of price variation among pharmacies.  In addition to factors that affect incentives for 
search, these variation effects include pharmacy specific effects that arise from differences in 
costs associated with heterogeneous services, variations in wholesale costs, and variations in 
competition for specific drugs.  Following Sorensen, we estimate price level models to control 
for price variation caused by differences in the services offered by individual pharmacies, drug 
specific wholesale costs, and other variables unrelated to search costs. The residuals from these 
models are therefore “purged” of pharmacy and other non-search related effects.  We use the 
residuals  to  compute  measures  of  price  variability  for  each  drug.  These  measures  are  then 
regressed on drug characteristics and market characteristics that affect incentives for search.    
Five  alternative  price  level  models  are  estimated  to  control  for  the  effects  of  drug 
specific, pharmacy and other potential sources of heterogeneity, for which parameter estimates 
are reported in Table II.  Model 1 includes only drug characteristics, model 2 includes drug and 
pharmacy characteristics, model 3 includes drug and pharmacy variables and two interaction 
variables  between  drug  and  pharmacy  characteristics,  and  model  4  includes  two  additional 
market  characteristic  variables.      Model  5  is  identical  to  model  4  in  terms  of  explanatory 
variables, but standard errors are estimated using the cluster command in Stata to account for 
potential  city-related  clustering  effects.  Model  parameters  are  estimated  using  the  OLS 
procedures in Stata.  Cook and Weisberg (1983) tests indicated the presence of heteroskedesticity 
in the error terms and so robust standard errors are therefore estimated.     
(insert table II) 
Each price level model includes the following drug characteristics variables.  Indicator 
(zero-one)  variables  account  for  whether  the  drug  is  sold  under  a  brand  name  (Brand)  and  
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whether the drug is a brand name that faces competition from generic drugs (Brand Substitutes). 
Other variables identify the number of drugs that provide alternative therapies for conditions 
treated by the drug of interest (Substitutes), the number of companies manufacturing the drug 
(Manufacturers), and the drug‟s estimated average wholesale cost to pharmacies (Average Cost).   
Sixteen drug treatment class variables identify the types of ailments for which each drug 
is used. For example, prescriptions used to treat chronic conditions might create more benefits 
from search because of the repeat nature of their demand.  These sixteen variables are included 
to control for the primary use of the drug, but their results are not reported for brevity.   
Twenty three pharmacy-specific characteristic variables were utilized in models 2-5 in 
table II.  They include the total number of hours a pharmacy is opened, two dummy variables 
indicating  whether  or  not  the  pharmacy  is  open  on  Saturdays  and  Sundays,  seven  dummy 
variables that account for eight primary wholesalers of pharmaceuticals, six dummy variables 
that  account  for  seven  secondary  wholesalers,  two    dummy  variables  that  account  for  the 
availability of any delivery services and free delivery, and five variables that account for other 
differences among pharmacies in their business operations (whether or not the pharmacy is a 
member of a chain or buying group, located in a grocery or big box department store, near a 
hospital,  or  as  a  standalone  operation,  and  provides  a  wide  or  limited  range  of  non-
pharmaceutical products).  Individual parameter estimates are reported in Appendix A (table AI) 
for the ten pharmacy characteristics variables that describe service attributes, chain membership, 
and location.       
Market characteristics are included in model 4 in Table II.  One measure of competition 
among  sellers  within  a  market  is  the  number  of  sellers  per  thousand  people  in  that  market 
(Pharmacies  per  1000  people).    Markets  in  Canada  represent  another  potential  source  
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competition.  Hence,  the  distance  from  each  Montana  market  to  its  closest  Canadian  market 
(Distance  to  Canada)  is  included  with  both  linear  and  quadratic  terms.  Finally,  interaction 
variables between whether a pharmacy belongs to a chain of stores and two drug characteristics, 
brand and the number of substitutes are included (Chain_Brand, and Chain_Brand_Substitutes). 
These variables account for the possibility that chains  may have different  mark-up rates for 
patented brands, brands with generic competitors, and generic drugs.    
The general pattern of results for the price level models is as follows.  A drug‟s retail 
price  is  likely  to  increase  as  its  average  wholesale  cost  increases.    As  expected,  parameter 
estimates reported in Table II for Average Cost are positive and statistically significant at the one 
percent  level.  The  Average  Cost  variable  was  constructed  as  follows.    In  2004,  Montana‟s 
Medicaid reimbursements to pharmacies were the equivalent of 85 percent of a drug‟s average 
wholesale price (AWP), considered to be the cost of obtaining the drug, plus a fixed dispensing 
fee of $4.70 per prescription.  Contracts between insurance companies and pharmacies often use 
formulas similar to those established by Medicaid.  Thus the variable Average Cost, which serves 
as a proxy for the average cost to a pharmacy of acquiring a drug, is measured as the sum of the 
drug‟s AWP and the Medicaid prescription fee of $4.70.
v   
As competition increases from substitute drugs, a drug‟s price is expected to be lower.  
Parameter estimates for the variable Number of Substitutes are negative, generally significant at 
the one to ten percent level, and therefore consistent with this hypothesis.  As the number of 
manufacturers providing the same drug increases and competition among them increases, the 
price  of  that  drug  might  be  expected  to  fall.  However,  an  increase  in  the  number  of 
manufacturers  may  result  in  differences  in  production  costs  and,  therefore,  differences  in 
wholesale prices that are passed through to the retail level.  Parameter estimates for the variable  
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Number of Manufacturers are positive and significant at the one percent level, and therefore, 
indicate that the latter influence may be more important than competition effects. 
The degree of competition in the market for a specific drug is likely to inversely affect 
the price at which the drug is sold.  If the drug is a brand name drug (Brand equals one), then its 
price is expected to be higher.  However, if that same drug faces competition from generic 
substitutes (Brand Substitutes equals one), its price is expected to be lower.  Results presented in 
Table II support these hypotheses.  In all eight models, the coefficient for Brand is positive while 
the coefficient for Brand Substitutes is negative, and both are statistically significant at the one 
percent level.   
Drug prices appear to be lower in pharmacies located within a mile of a hospital, higher 
in pharmacies that open on Saturdays, and lower in pharmacies that open on Sundays (with 
coefficients  that  are  statistically  significant  at  the  ten  percent  level).  Other  pharmacy 
characteristics  do  not  appear  to  have  any  systematic  effects  on  pharmaceutical  drug  pricing 
decisions.  A  pharmacy‟s  choice  of  primary  and  secondary  wholesaler  may  also  affect  price 
levels.  Coefficients  for  the  dummy  variables  for  three  primary  wholesale  sources  and  two 
secondary wholesale sources are statistically significant from zero in some models. 
The  price  level  models  explain  some  of  the  within-sample  differences  in  prices.  
Unadjusted coefficients of determination (R-squared) are about 0.91 for the models presented in 
Table II.  However, a considerable amount of variation remains to be explained.  Among the 75 
drugs, the average estimated standard deviation of the price of a drug within a given market 
computed using the price data obtained in the survey is $5.85 and the average difference between 
the highest and lowest price for a drug is $15.84.  Using the residuals obtained from the most 
comprehensive price level model (model 4), the average estimated standard deviation is $5.30  
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and  the  average  range  is  $14.25.    Thus  price  level  model  4,  which  accounts  for  pharmacy, 
manufacturer,  and  other  sources  of  heterogeneity,  reduces  the  estimated  average  standard 
deviation and range of drug prices by about ten percent. 
IV.  MODELS OF PRICE DISPERSION 
  Price dispersion within a market for a specific drug is likely to be a function of physical 
drug characteristics that affect incentives for search, characteristics of the supply side of the 
market  that  affect  competition,  and  characteristics  of  consumers  in  the  market  that  affect 
incentives for search.  Two market characteristics variables related to search costs, Percent 65 
and Percent Poverty, are also included in the price dispersion models.  Again, elderly individuals 
are expected to have lower search costs, due to repeat purchasing of drugs, and low income 
individuals are expected to have greater search benefits, due to a more constrained budget and/or 
lack of health insurance.  Price dispersion within each market is expected to be inversely related 
to both of these indicators of search intensity. 
To control for other factors that cause price dispersion, we include drug characteristics 
that affect the expected benefits consumers obtain from search.  Returns to search are likely to be 
larger for drugs whose prescriptions have to be filled more frequently to complete a therapy than 
for drugs whose prescriptions have to be filled only once or twice, and so price dispersion is 
assumed to depend on annual frequency of use as measured by the variable Purchase Frequency.  
Purchase frequency is measured as follows.  Each drug‟s estimated typical dosage per day is 
multiplied  by  the  typical  length  of  treatment,  which  is  then  divided  by  the  typical  quantity 
provided in a prescription to estimate the number of times in a year the typical patient has to 
purchase the drug.
vi  Drugs with estimated annual purchase frequencies of less than one are  
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allocated a purchase frequency of one because at least one prescription must be filled if it is to be 
used. 
More  expensive  drugs  are  also  likely  to  offer  greater  returns  from  consumer  search.  
Given that the measures of price dispersion used in this study are ranges and standard deviations, 
including  an  indicator  of  average  cost  in  the  price  dispersion  model  may  normalize  for 
differences  in  price  levels.  The  estimated  average  cost  to  a  pharmacy  of  obtaining  a  drug, 
Average Cost, is used as a proxy for the average price of the drug to a consumer.      
The number of manufacturers of a single drug may increase price dispersion because of 
differences  in  production  costs  among  the  competing  firms  that  lead  to  different  wholesale 
prices.  Pharmacies tend to purchase drugs from one or two wholesalers, and those wholesalers 
obtain the same drugs from multiple manufacturers and re-packagers.  These cost differences, 
therefore, are one potential source of price dispersion.  A patented branded drug produced by a 
single manufacturer is also likely to exhibit less price dispersion among pharmacies because 
wholesalers can only purchase the drug from one manufacturer and, absent price discrimination 
among wholesalers by the manufacturer, only one wholesale price.  Thus price dispersion is 
likely to be directly related to Manufacturer and inversely related to Brand.     
Competition from other drugs may also affect price dispersion.  A branded drug that 
faces competition from generic substitutes may exhibit less price dispersion because competition 
from generics reduces the incidence of high prices by increasing the probability that a low price 
is  observed  for  any  given  level  of  consumer  search.    Increases  in  the  number  of  generic 
substitutes are likely to further increase the probability that a given amount of search will result 
in the observation of a low price and reduce price dispersion.  Hence, price dispersion is likely to 
be inversely related to the variables Brand Substitutes and Substitutes.    
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Finally, potential competition from other markets in which all drug prices are believed to 
be lower may reduce prices at the high end of the price distribution.  This hypothesis implies that 
markets closer to Canada may experience less price dispersion. 
V.  RESULTS 
The effects of drug and market characteristics on price dispersion are examined using 
four different price dispersion measures for each drug within each market.  These four measures 
are (a) the range and (b) the standard deviation for each of the 75 drugs computed directly using 
the prices obtained from the pharmacy survey, and (c) the range and (d) the standard deviation 
for each drug estimated using the residuals from the price level models presented in Table II. 
5.1  Pooled OLS  
Table III columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 present parameter estimates for models in which the 
measures of price dispersion based on residuals from a price level model (model 4 from table II).  
Price dispersion model parameters and robust standard errors were estimated using OLS and 
related procedures in Stata.  Although three city specific variables were included in several of the 
price dispersion models, clustering of price differences by city could still be a concern (see, for 
example, Wooldridge).  However, accounting for clustering effects in the estimation procedures 
has  little  impact  on  the  estimated  standard  errors  relative  to  those  obtained  using  robust 
estimation procedures that account for potential heteroskedasticity.  In particular, the standard 
errors and t-statistics associated with market specific variables such as percent in poverty and 
percent elderly were essentially unchanged.   
(insert table III) 
  In table III, two regression models are estimated to explain variations in each of the four 
price  dispersion  measures.    Model  1  includes  only  drug  characteristic  variables:  Purchase  
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Frequency, Brand, Brand Substitutes, Substitutes, Manufacturers, and Average Cost.  Model 2 
also includes the three market characteristic variables: Percent Poverty, Percent65, and Distance 
to Canada.  
  The central concern of this study is the role of market characteristics of search costs in 
determining price dispersion.  Search effort is related both to the benefits consumers expect to 
receive and the search costs they incur.  The two market specific indicators of search costs are 
Percent Poverty and Percent65.  The elderly and the poor are assumed to have relatively low 
search costs and high benefits.  Many of the elderly are likely to obtain smaller costs from search 
because they have to obtain multiple prescriptions on a regular basis.  Low income households 
are less likely to be insured and therefore more likely to pay the full price of a prescription drug.  
Thus, they may also obtain relatively large benefits from search.   
Parameter estimates for both these variables are uniformly negative and in four of the 
eight  models  for  which  results  are  reported  (the  models  that  explain  the  standard  deviation 
measures of price dispersion) statistically significant at either the ten percent or five percent 
confidence level.  Thus, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that price dispersion is 
lower in markets where search costs are low and expected benefits relatively substantial for 
larger proportions of the population. 
Also of some concern is the parameter estimates for the Distance from Canada, which 
are negative and statistically significant at the ten percent level in three of them.  This result is 
not consistent with the hypothesis that pharmacies close to Canada face more competition and 
exhibit less price dispersion.  Furthermore, in Table 2, there is no evidence that proximity to 
Canada had any effect on the level of drug prices or price in Montana markets in the summer of 
2004.  One explanation for this result is that transportation costs (including travel time) are  
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generally relatively large.  For example, the shortest distance between a Montana and Canadian 
market is over seventy miles and involves a two and half hour round trip journey.  In addition, in 
the summer of 2004, some Canadian companies were marketing drugs to all U.S. customers via 
the internet.
vii 
5.2 Purchase Frequency and Population Characteristics 
To further emphasize the impact of population characteristics on price dispersion, we sort 
the data by Purchase Frequency, which is presumed to capture repeated searches.
viii  Drugs that 
are  purchased once have a much smaller benefit from search, and the impact of population 
characteristics is expected to be less for drugs that are purchased less frequently.  Table IV 
presents the same price dispersion (model 2) results for high and low purchase frequency drugs.  
High purchase frequency implies that the drug is purchased more than 12 times in a year.   
The results for the population characteristics are similar to earlier results with a negative 
coefficient for all measures of price dispersion  and statistical significance for two measures: 
standard deviation and residual standard deviation.  
For these population characteristics, the magnitude and statistical significance of the 
estimated coefficients is greater for drugs with a high purchase fre quency.  Although the 
coefficients for population characteristics is not statistically different for low and high purchase 
frequency drugs, the result provides some support that when search benefits are high and search 
costs low, the elderly and poor will search more, lowering the amount of price dispersion. 
5.3 Average Cost and Population Characteristics 
We  also  sort  the  data  by  Average  Cost,  which is  presumed  to  capture  benefits  from 
search.
ix Drugs with a high average cost are correlated with more price d ispersion and therefore 
greater benefits from search than low cost drugs.  Table V presents the price dispersion model 2  
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results for high and low cost drugs.  High cost drugs are drugs that have an average cost greater 
than $50.   
Again, for these population characteristics, the magnitude and statistical significance of 
the estimated coefficients is greater for drugs with a high average cost.  This result emphasizes 
that when search benefits are high, the elderly and poor will search more, lowering the amount of 
price dispersion. 
     We further note that for low cost drugs, Purchase Frequency has a positive impact on 
price dispersion.  For low cost drugs that are repeatedly purchased, price dispersion is large, 
perhaps due to the perceived view of small search benefits. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
  The law of one price implies that commodities with the same physical attributes should 
be offered at the same price by different sellers in the same market under the same conditions of 
sale.  This is often not true even when, as is the case with pharmaceutical drugs, the commodities 
offered  for  sale  in  a  given  market  have  identical  physical  characteristics.    This  paper  has 
reexamined  the  law  of  one  price  and  price  dispersion  for  pharmaceutical  drugs  in  five 
geographically isolated markets more than eighty miles apart from one another in Montana, the 
fourth largest of the lower 48 states, in which there are less than 1 million people.   Price data for 
75 drugs were obtained from a “point in time” survey of 33 pharmacies in the five communities 
and four measures of price dispersion for each drug in each market were constructed.   
  Prices  for  the  same  drug  varied  substantially  among  pharmacies  in  each  of  the  five 
markets  in  ways  that  could  not  be  explained  simply  by  differences  in  pharmacy  services.  
However,  price  dispersion  is  lower  for  a  drug  when  the  expected  benefits  from  search  are 
greater.  Price dispersion is lower for drugs with higher prices and there is some evidence that  
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relative price dispersion is lower for drugs that are purchased more frequently.  These results 
confirm the findings reported by Sorenson in his study of pharmaceutical drug prices in two 
communities in up-state New York.   
  In addition, in the five Montana markets examined in this study, price dispersion is lower 
in markets where the proportion of elderly in the population or the proportion of individuals in 
poverty is relatively large.  The elderly and the poor both have relatively low opportunity costs 
of time, relatively large expected benefits from search, and, therefore, relatively high levels of 
search effort.  Additionally, when search benefits are high, as is the case for high average cost 
drugs, the impact of population characteristics is greater.  We also find similar evidence when 
search costs are low as is the case for repeatedly purchased drugs.  These new findings provide 
additional empirical support for the hypothesis that price dispersion is affected by consumer 
search effort, which in turn is influenced by economic incentives.   
This relationship is particularly critical to healthcare reform policies that may affect a 
person‟s decision to search for the lowest priced medicine.  The main findings reported above 
support the view that policies that lower search costs and raise expected benefits can increase 
informed decision-making and decrease price dispersion.  Various proposals have incentivized 
consumers of healthcare services to search more, but typically, they encourage searching over 
healthcare providers rather than the service or good itself. 
One such policy that has reduced the incentive to search is Medicare (Part D), whose 
coverage started in January 1, 2006 after the time period we considered.  The results of our study 
suggest that increased prescription drug coverage reduces the incentive for search.  Closing the 
„donut hole‟ may have increased price dispersion due to the potential for increased rents for 
pharmacies.  
 
Working Paper – Do not cite without the permission from the authors. 
 
One weakness with the data is the relatively small sample of cities used in the cross-
sectional  regression.  Cross-country  and  cross-city  comparisons  with  a  few  observations  are 
common, but we note that the empirical findings can only suggest a link between search effort 
and price dispersion, and are not conclusive.  More importantly, our study provides new findings 
observing  a  possible  relationship  between  search  effort  and  population  characteristics.    This 
relationship  should  be  considered  when  developing  healthcare  reform  policies,  but  further 
research on the relationship should be studied. 
   Finally, this study provides little or no evidence that access to pharmaceuticals from 
Canadian  markets  had  any  measurable  effects  on  either  prescription  price  levels  or  price 
dispersion in 2004.   This is worth noting in light of the extensive media attention given to the 
issue of the availability of much lower priced drugs in Canada during 2004 and early 2005.  One 
reason for the finding may have been that during that time many U.S. consumers could obtain 
prescription  drugs  from  Canadian  outlets  through  the  internet  and,  therefore,  geographic 
proximity to Canadian markets was unimportant.  Another may be that for most consumers in the 
markets  examined  in  this  study,  travel  costs  exceeded  any  potential  savings  from  buying 
prescription drugs in Canadian markets, even though such gains appeared to be quite substantial 
for some drugs.    
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Table I:  Price Levels and Measures of Price Dispersion for Selected Drugs in Five Montana 
Markets 
 
  Drug 
  Acetam.Cod.#3 





0.5  Mg  (30 
doses) 
Amoxil 
250  Mg  
(30caps) 
Atenolol 






Billings   Mean  $9.80  $93.90  $12.80  $13.51  $9.95  $121.13 
Range  1.74  14.02  21.34  9.95  8.32  43.88 
SD  0.58  4.97  8.14  4.4  3.19  15.92 
CV  6%  5%  64%  33%  32%  13% 
Bozeman   Mean  $13.51  $89.65  $12.63  $11.70  $9.49  $122.20 
Range  7.89  13.77  7.99  9.15  5.53  16.98 
SD  2.93  5.42  3.26  4.08  2.07  6.23 
CV  22%  6%  26%  35%  22%  5% 
Great 
Falls  
Mean  $11.17  $87.41  $13.58  $10.28  $11.97  $103.24 
Range  7.72  11.99  13.21  3.42  20.99  30 
SD  2.89  5.62  5.33  1.64  8.96  11.32 
CV  26%  6%  39%  16%  75%  15% 
Kalispell  Mean  $11.41  $89.65  $10.94  $10.25  $9.44  $116.89 
Range  5.71  13.1  7  8.07  4.5  34 
SD  1.83  4.82  2.34  2.47  1.48  11.42 
CV  16%  5%  21%  24%  16%  10% 
Missoula   Mean  $10.48  $88.39  $12.21  $9.82  $7.91  $119.52 
Range  5.94  13.01  16.28  7.64  7.81  25.16 
SD  2.16  4.57  5.16  2.69  2.55  8.82 
CV  21%  5%  42%  27%  32%  7% 
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A      Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses below each parameter estimate in models 1, 2 3 and 4.  The superscripts ***, 
**, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels, respectively. The standard errors reported for model 5 
are obtained using the cluster command in State to account for potential clustering effects.  The models presented in Table II also 
include dummy variables for sixteen different treatment categories of drugs. Parameter estimates for these treatment class variables are 
not reported. 
 
B    Models 2, 3, 4 and 5 include a set of 22 pharmacy characteristic variables for which parameter estimates are reported in table AI in 
the appendix. 
 
C    Chain_Brand equals one if the pharmacy is a member of a chain and the drug is a patented brand.  Chain_Brand_Substitutes 




Drug  and  Pharmacy 
Effects 
(2) 
Drug,  Pharmacy,  and 
Drug  &  Pharmacy 
Effects 
(3) 
Drug,  Pharmacy, 
Drug  &  Pharmacy, 
and City Effects 
(4) 
Drug,  Pharmacy, 
Drug  &  Pharmacy, 




Brand  24.585***  24.608***  23.070***  23.070***  23.070*** 
  (1.43)  (1.42)  (1.77)  (1.77)  (1.39) 
Brand with Substitutes  -6.829***  -6.923***  -6.596***  -6.595***  -6.595*** 
  (0.91)  (0.88)  (1.31)  (1.31)  (0.94) 
Number of Substitutes  -0.023*  -0.024*  -0.024*  -0.024*  -0.024*** 
  (0.01)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.01)  (0.004) 
Average Cost  1.048***  1.048***  1.048***  1.048***  1.048*** 
  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
Number of 
Manufacturers  1.106***  1.107***  1.108***  1.107***  1.107*** 
  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.05) 
Distance to Canada  -  -  -  -0.051  -0.051 
        (1.18)  (0.91) 
Distance to Canada
2  -  -  -  0.001  0.001 
        (0.02)  (0.02) 
Pharmacies  per  1000 
People  -  -  -  -4.394  -4.394 
        (7.21)  (6.06) 
Chain_Brand
C  -  -  2.316  2.315  2.315 
      (1.54)  (1.54)  (1.82) 
Chain_Brand with 
Substitutes  -  -  -0.504  -0.500  -0.500 
      (1.49)  (1.49)  (1.24) 
Constant  -170.454***  -189.634  -188.723***  -184.698***  -184.698*** 
  (5.06)  (9.65)  (9.65)  (16.20)  (12.87) 
Observations  2334  2334  2334  2334  2334 
R-squared  0.9117  0.9149  0.9149  0.9151  0.9151  
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Table III.  Price Dispersion Models
A 
 


























Percent Poverty  -  -  -  -  -0.245  -0.59**  -1.014  -0.808*** 
          (0.71)  (0.27)  (0.75)  (0.28) 
Percent 65  -  -  -  -  -0.582  -0.680**  -1.030  -0.810*** 
          (0.76)  (0.29)  (0.80)  (0.30) 
Purchase Frequency  0.086  0.053  0.051  0.040  0.086  0.053  0.051  0.040 
  (0.14)  (0.05)  (0.12)  (0.04)  (0.14)  (0.05)  (0.12)  (0.04) 
Average Cost  0.186***  0.067***  0.158***  0.060***  0.186***  0.067***  0.158***  0.060*** 
  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
Manufacturers  0.305*  0.107*  0.220  0.087  0.305*  0.107*  0.220  0.087 
  (0.17)  (0.06)  (0.17)  (0.06)  (0.18)  (0.06)  (0.17)  (0.06) 
Brand  -3.020*  -1.225**  -5.165***  -2.17***  -3.020*  -1.225**  -5.165***  -2.171*** 
  (1.60)  (0.57)  (1.72)  (0.58)  (1.59)  (0.57)  (1.69)  (0.57) 
Brand Substitutes  4.563***  1.691***  5.784***  2.29***  4.563***  1.691***  5.784***  2.292*** 
  (1.68)  (0.56)  (1.72)  (0.60)  (1.71)  (0.57)  (1.71)  (0.58) 
Substitutes  -0.044***  -0.014**  -0.032**  -0.010*  -0.044***  -0.014**  -0.032**  -0.010* 
  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.005)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.005) 
Distance to Canada  -  -  -  -  -0.134  -0.176*  -0.423*  -0.258*** 
          (0.24)  (0.09)  (0.25)  (0.10) 
Constant  -28.041***  -9.974***  -22.332***  -8.66***  -13.205  12.562  17.399  20.979** 
  (6.22)  (2.21)  (5.78)  (2.13)  (27.06)  (10.27)  (28.50)  (10.57) 
Observations  370  370  370  370  370  370  370  370 
R-squared  0.4145  0.4302  0.3382  0.3626  0.4218  0.4438  0.3498  0.3802 
 
A   Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis.   The superscripts ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels, 
respectively.  These models also include sixteen treatment class dummy variables for which parameter estimates are not reported.  
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Table IV.  Price Dispersion Models for Low and High Purchase Frequency Drugs
A 
 


























Percent Poverty  -0.371  -0.637*  -0.876  -0.764*  -0.771  -0.718*  -1.168  -0.852** 
  (0.97)  (0.38)  (1.05)  (0.40)  (1.07)  (0.41)  (1.10)  (0.41) 
Percent 65  0.016  -0.524  -0.87  -0.764**  -0.479  -0.651*  -1.143  -0.848** 
  (0.89)  (0.36)  (0.98)  (0.38)  (1.00)  (0.39)  (1.04)  (0.39) 
Purchase Frequency  -1.103  -0.433*  -1.288*  -0.523**  -  -  -  - 
  (0.73)  (0.23)  (0.74)  (0.23)  -  -  -  - 
Average Cost  0.226***  0.082***  0.198***  0.075***  0.069  0.025*  0.054  0.024 
  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.01) 
Manufacturers  0.396  0.142*  0.178  0.091  -0.109  -0.041  -0.017  -0.011 
  (0.24)  (0.08)  (0.29)  (0.09)  (0.26)  (0.09)  (0.21)  (0.07) 
Brand  -4.119  -1.71  -6.391*  -2.585**  2.802  1.028  0.63  -0.068 
  (3.03)  (1.05)  (3.41)  (1.14)  (2.66)  (0.97)  (2.66)  (0.96) 
Brand Substitutes  4.845*  1.889**  5.758**  2.375***  4.155  1.527  6.418  2.742* 
  (2.51)  (0.82)  (2.60)  (0.89)  (4.77)  (1.58)  (4.57)  (1.50) 
Substitutes  -0.067**  -0.023**  -0.04  -0.013  0.013  0.006  -0.015  -0.003 
  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.01)  (0.05)  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.01) 
Distance to Canada  -0.048  -0.152  -0.348  -0.234*  -0.212  -0.197  -0.491  -0.280** 
  (0.31)  (0.12)  (0.34)  (0.13)  (0.34)  (0.13)  (0.35)  (0.13) 
Constant  16.976  24.388*  48.36  32.736**  30.942  27.539*  51.592  34.267** 
  (34.06)  (13.20)  (36.50)  (13.83)  (37.78)  (14.58)  (38.68)  (14.46) 
Observations  175  175  175  175  195  195  195  195 
R-squared  0.542  0.572  0.46  0.504  0.29  0.312  0.244  0.259 
 
A   Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis.   The superscripts ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels, 
respectively.  These models also include sixteen treatment class dummy variables for which parameter estimates are not reported.  High purchase frequency 
implies that the drug is purchased more than 12 times in a year.  
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Table V.  Price Dispersion Models for Low and High Average Cost Drugs
A 
 


























Percent Poverty  0.129  -0.328  -0.126  -0.469*  -1.465  -1.116**  -2.153  -1.235** 
  (0.83)  (0.30)  (0.77)  (0.27)  (1.30)  (0.50)  (1.45)  (0.55) 
Percent 65  0.569  -0.169  -0.096  -0.422*  -1.255  -1.115**  -2.155  -1.287** 
  (0.77)  (0.28)  (0.71)  (0.25)  (1.23)  (0.48)  (1.37)  (0.53) 
Purchase Frequency  0.561**  0.224**  0.573**  0.231***  0.121  0.067  0.126  0.086 
  (0.28)  (0.10)  (0.23)  (0.08)  (0.24)  (0.09)  (0.20)  (0.08) 
Average Cost  0.537***  0.197***  0.415***  0.163***  0.123***  0.048***  0.113***  0.048*** 
  (0.12)  (0.04)  (0.10)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.01) 
Manufacturers  0.122  0.041  -0.045  -0.011  1.504*  0.500**  1.618*  0.570** 
  (0.16)  (0.06)  (0.13)  (0.05)  (0.82)  (0.25)  (0.87)  (0.28) 
Brand  -7.407**  -2.707**  -6.765**  -2.879***  -3.335  -1.059  -8.942*  -3.132** 
  (3.35)  (1.18)  (2.99)  (1.09)  (2.78)  (0.98)  (4.75)  (1.48) 
Brand Substitutes  8.207**  2.790***  7.544***  2.969***  2.283  1.058  1.843  0.976 
  (3.22)  (1.04)  (2.84)  (0.98)  (3.01)  (0.98)  (3.36)  (1.12) 
Substitutes  -0.009  0.001  0.017  0.008  -0.026  -0.009  -0.019  -0.005 
  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.05)  (0.02)  (0.05)  (0.01) 
Distance to Canada  0.139  -0.045  -0.098  -0.136  -0.475  -0.338**  -0.827*  -0.411** 
  (0.26)  (0.09)  (0.24)  (0.09)  (0.42)  (0.16)  (0.47)  (0.18) 
Constant  -21.134  5.126  2.38  13.479  55.188  41.509**  90.133*  48.113** 
  (30.17)  (10.95)  (28.49)  (10.09)  (46.68)  (18.00)  (51.87)  (19.53) 
Observations  205  205  205  205  165  165  165  165 
R-squared  0.385  0.396  0.328  0.361  0.472  0.517  0.425  0.474 
 
A   Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis.   The superscripts ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels, 
respectively.  These models also include sixteen treatment class dummy variables for which parameter estimates are not reported.  High cost drugs are drugs that 
have an average cost greater than $50.  
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Appendix  




  Price Level Model 
Variable 












Drug  & 
Pharmacy, 






Items Missing  0.185  0.185  0.127  0.127 
  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.14)  (0.13) 
Delivery   -3.338  -3.348  -4.385  -4.385 
  (3.02)  (3.02)  (3.32)  (3.26) 
Free Delivery  1.975  1.985  2.108  2.108 
  (2.97)  (2.97)  (3.50)  (3.14) 
Chain  4.185**  2.825  2.659  2.659 
  (1.87)  (1.99)  (2.43)  (1.91) 
Hospital
B  -4.618***  -4.617***  -2.993  -2.993 
  (1.69)  (1.69)  (2.40)  (2.57) 
Grocery  2.683***  2.683***  1.680  1.680 
  (1.03)  (1.03)  (1.46)  (1.13) 
Department  -4.651***  -4.652***  -2.617  -2.617 
  (1.67)  (1.67)  (2.42)  (2.07) 
Hours Open  0.096  0.096  0.048  0.048 
  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.14)  (0.14) 
Open Saturdays  4.416  4.390  4.728  4.728* 
  (3.19)  (3.19)  (3.31)  (2.58) 
Open Sundays
  -5.796**  -5.792**  -5.646  -5.646 
  (2.74)  (2.74)  (3.45)  (3.40) 
Observations  2334  2334  2334  2334 
R-squared  0.9149  0.9149  0.9151  0.9151 
A Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses.  Superscripts ***, **, * respectively indicate that a coefficient is statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level respectively.  Class models include dummy variables for 16 different categorized drugs. Parameter estimates for the 13 dummy variables accounting 
for primary and secondary wholesalers are omitted because little is known about these wholesalers and therefore their interpretation is of limited interest. 
B Hospital has a value of 1 if the pharmacy is within a mile of a hospital.  Pharmacies located in hospitals were excluded from the survey because many are 
owned and operated by the hospital and their pricing structures may be linked to pricing structures for other hospital services.  
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i Seven pharmacies located in markets not included in the study were asked to pretest a 
preliminary survey instrument which included the top 150 most frequently prescribed drugs in 
2003.  These pharmacies expressed concerns about response burden.  To lower the response 
burden for each pharmacist and increase response rates, the final survey instrument asked 
pharmacists to provide data on prices for 75 of those drugs.   
 
ii Pharmacies with the same corporate parent often have similar pricing menus.  Due to the small 
size of towns in Montana, only Billings includes two pharmacies with the same corporate parent 
in the same city.  Even with the theory of pricing menus, we still find price dispersion across 
cities, suggesting that consumer search costs have an even greater impact. 
 
iiiOne concern with the data is whether drug prices were collected during a period in which those 
prices were systematically changing, resulting in a misleading impression of price differences 
among pharmacies.  All of the data were collected over a six week period in late July and August 
of 2004 during which general inflation was negligible and fiscal or marketing year ends for most 
drug companies did not occur.  Thus, it is unlikely that systemati c adjustments to wholesale or 
retail prices were implemented during the data collection period.   
 
iv  Response  bias  is  an  important  problem  to  consider  in  the  sample,  given  that  some  chain 
pharmacies cited corporate policy as their rationale for non-response.  To examine this problem, 
correlations between non-prescription item prices and drug prices were examined.  If systematic 
correlations exist, non-responders could be identified as either high-price or low-price firms, 
based on the price data for the 38 non-prescription items collected independently by the authors  
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from each pharmacy.  No statistically significant correlations were found between the prices of 
non-prescription items and prescription drugs among responders.  Further, although some chain 
pharmacies cited corporate policy as their reason for not participating in the survey, several 
pharmacies from the same chains did provide responses.  Thus, there is no evidence to suggest 
that response bias is a serious problem in the data set.   
 
v Information on the links between drug cost reimbursements for pharmacies in Montana under 
the Medicaid and insurance contracts was provided to the authors through personal 
communications from two practicing pharmacists. 
 
vi For example, Atenolol is a beta-blocker typically taken once a day for the rest of a person‟s life 
with a prescription quantity of 30 pills.  Thus the estimated annual frequency of purchase for 
Atenolol is 12.17 (= 1* 365/ 30).   
 
vii In table III, the estimated coefficients for Brand are negative and statistically significant at the 
ten percent level.   These results are consistent with the hypothesis that branded drugs produced 
by only one manufacturer exhibit less price dispersion because production costs do not vary as 
they could if more than one manufacturer made a drug.  All eight parameter estimates for 
Manufacturers are positive and six are statistically significant at the ten percent level or better.  
These results provide some additional support for the hypotheses that variations in costs among 
manufacturers are a source of price dispersion among retailers.  All eight parameter estimates for 
Substitutes are negative and statistically significant, indicating that competition decreases price 
dispersion.  Parameter estimates for Brand Substitutes are positive and statistically significant.   
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These findings are not consistent with the hypothesis that, when branded drugs face competition 
from generic substitutes, less price dispersion is observed.  In contrast, the results reported in 
table III suggest that the advent of generic substitutes may increase price variability, perhaps 
because the markets for the branded drug and the generics becomes segmented between 
consumers who are concerned about the quality of generics and those who are not. 
 
viii In the estimation models reported in Table III,  parameter estimates for Purchase Frequency 
are positive but not statistically significant different from zero.  These estimation models include 
indicator variables for sixteen treatment classes.  In similar models that exclude those variables 
(not reported here to conserve space), Purchase Frequency coefficients are negative and 
generally statistically significant.   These results indicate that frequency of purchase is highly 
correlated with class of treatment, a conclusion that accords with medical common sense.  Drugs 
needed to treat similar illnesses (for example, beta blockers or pain killers) are likely to be 
prescribed in similar doses and with similar treatment protocols. 
 
ix In all eight models presented in Table III, in which the dependent variable is an absolute 
measure of price dispersion, parameter estimates for Average Cost are consistently positive and 
statistically significant.  These results indicate that, ceteris paribus, as the average price of a drug 
increases, the absolute amount of price dispersion increases.  However, in each of these models, 
the results imply that the ratio of the price dispersion measure to average cost declines as average 
cost (and the price of a drug) increases.  Thus, the results suggest that relative measures of price 
dispersion, such as the coefficient of variation, decrease as average prices increase.  This finding  
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is consistent with the hypothesis that as benefits from search increase relative price dispersion 
decreases. 